Abstract

Iran urged Middle-Eastern governments to respect the legitimate demands of their people and to put an end to despotism in these countries. However, Iran adopted a different foreign policy on the protests against the Syrian government, which was the total support of the government against its opponents. The reason to adopt this tactic is Iran’s strategic point of view that the regional political systems are categorized according to two different strategies. Accordingly, Iran should support the protests in these countries and urge for fulfilling the legitimate demands of the people there. But we should adopt a different policy with regard to protests in countries like Syria, which are in the resistance line against domination system. From the view point of Iranian officials, the protests and unrests in Syria are the result of a pre-designed Western scenario to challenge the legitimacy of Syrian political system, leading to different political array which weakens the resistance line in the region against the system of domination by changing the political system in this country. According to this view, Iran wants to protect the Syrian government in the context of a realistic analysis, given the Syria’s strategic importance and position. According to Iran's foreign policy officials, on the basis of Iran national interest preservation, it is necessary for Iran to use its full capacity to help and protect the Syrian government in order to maintain and strengthen its regional role, the balance of power and the resistant forces.

Keywords:

Foreign policy, foreign relations, Iran, Syria crisis,

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