Abstract

Internet and cyberspace as many other shapes of technology has its own pros and cons. In addition to many advantages of internet, there are many crimes in different types which have unfavorable effects on people who use this pervasive kind of information technology. To deal with this situation we have employed international law according to economics procedures. In fact, the main goal of this study is about the survey of the role of international law according to economics approaches to conquer cyber-terrorism. Economic analysis of law suggests that customary international law is a more flexible, efficient and effective method for the development of international law capable of responding to cybercrime. Unlike treaty law, customary international law is based upon state cooperation without the requirement of formal written agreements. It is a dynamic process that minimizes the problems raised by transactional costs by allowing states to forego explicit negotiations and to function even in the absence of a formal structure. This study explains how these economic tools can assist states in developing dynamic and flexible customary international law that is sufficiently responsive to the scourge of cybercrime. Customary law presents the most efficient and effective means for the international community to address cybercrime. By borrowing principles from economics to align states' interests for purposes of forming cybercrime rules, states may achieve optimal customary international law that maximizes the welfare of the entire international community.

Keywords:

Customary law, cybercrime , cyber-terrorism, economics procedures, international law,

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The authors have no competing interests.

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