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     Research Journal of Mathematics and Statistics

    Abstract
2011(Vol.3, Issue:3)
Article Information:

Reduced Population Viscosity in Spatially Disordered, Triple Strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

K.A. Pimbblet
Corresponding Author:  Kevin Pimbblet 
Submitted: 2011 July, 20
Accepted: 2011 September, 07
Published: 2011 September, 25
Abstract:
Altruism in selfish groups of individuals has been explained using game theory. In this work, cooperation within a spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game is studied with three strategies: cooperation, defection or Tit-for-Tat. By imposing the condition of a site diluted lattice and relaxing the condition of strong population viscosity, the emergence of cooperating and defecting island universes is observed. Under a softer condition of movement such that players may move to a lattice site of at least equal payoff we find that these defecting islands become inherently unstable and dissociate to invade the rest of the system. This subsequently leads to a re-emergence of cooperation in the entire system as the Tit-for-Tat strategies knockout any rampant unconditional defection strategies. These results are interpreted suggestively in the context of biology and sociology.

Key words:  Emergent behaviour, game theory, population dynamics, , , ,
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Cite this Reference:
K.A. Pimbblet, . Reduced Population Viscosity in Spatially Disordered, Triple Strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Research Journal of Mathematics and Statistics, (3): 177-122.
ISSN (Online):  2040-7505
ISSN (Print):   2042-2024
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