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Abstract
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Article Information:
Analysis of Adverse Selection for Motivation Mechanism in Engineering Project Cost Management
Lin Yiyong, Wang Yousong and Liu Jingkuang
Corresponding Author: Lin Yiyong
Submitted: September 18, 2012
Accepted: October 19, 2012
Published: April 20, 2013 |
Abstract:
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When the principal-agent contracts for design, supervision and construction of an engineering project are signed, the agent and the principal have hidden information. By means of tendering and negotiation, etc., it selects an agent offering a lower quotation which leads to “Bad money drives out good”, that is, commonly termed adverse selection problem. This study starts from the discussion of adverse selection and introduces a motivation mechanism to motivate the agent to exert initiative strategies more efficiently so that the agent can expose its hidden information automatically. The study also analyzes the project principal-agent strategies and finally uses a calculation example to demonstrate that the motivation mechanism in this study is efficient in inducing the agent to tell the truth, which aids the principal in selecting an agent with higher operational level.
Key words: Adverse selection, cost management, engineering project, motivation mechanism, principal agent, ,
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Cite this Reference:
Lin Yiyong, Wang Yousong and Liu Jingkuang, . Analysis of Adverse Selection for Motivation Mechanism in Engineering Project Cost Management. Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology, (14): 3777-3782.
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ISSN (Online): 2040-7467
ISSN (Print): 2040-7459 |
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