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Article Information:
Informal Institutions as Constraints to an Active Market for Corporate Control: The Case of Japan
Dulal Miah and Ashfaque A. Mohib
Corresponding Author: Dulal Miah
Submitted: October 30, 2012
Accepted: December 21, 2012
Published: June 15, 2013 |
Abstract:
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The market for corporate control serves as an external mechanism for corporate governance and plays a vital role particularly in the market-oriented economies. However, the system is much less prevalent in Japan than its counterparts like USA and UK. This study aims at explaining the state of underdeveloped corporate takeover market in Japan shedding an analytical light on informal institutions including relation or trust among and between groups. Informal institutions work as fundamental building blocks for corporate governance which in turn, have either led the market for corporate control a redundant institution or worked as hindrance to its development in Japan. Support to this argument is provided through analyzing various anecdotal facts from the current affairs as well as a widely-cited case, Livedoor-Fuji TV takeover battle.
Key words: Corporate governance, corporate takeover, informal institutions, Japan, , ,
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Cite this Reference:
Dulal Miah and Ashfaque A. Mohib, . Informal Institutions as Constraints to an Active Market for Corporate Control: The Case of Japan. Asian Journal of Business Management, (3): 291-299.
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ISSN (Online): 2041-8752
ISSN (Print): 2041-8744 |
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